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The Impact on Public Law of Privatization,
Deregulation, Outsourcing, and Downsizing: A
Canadian Perspective*
DAVID MULLAN** AND ANTONELLA CEDDIA***
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, Canada, following the lead of other Western
democracies, has engaged in numerous, and at times fundamental, experiments
in reducing or reconfiguring the role played by government. These experiments
have been conducted, with varying levels of intensity and in varying forms,
among the provinces and territories of Canada, as well as at the federal level.
Foremost among the governments committed to this enterprise have been those
of the provinces of Alberta (since 1992), Ontario (since 1995), and, from late
2001, British Columbia. The objective of the Canadian governments which
have enthusiastically espoused this project has been in part making their
jurisdictions more hospitable to international investment and other forms of
participation. The restraints of public law in general, and regulatory oversight
in particular, seem to many to be incompatible with increasing globalization
within this environment.
Great public controversy has surrounded the efforts of these governments,
despite the fact that they were elected because of their commitment to reducing
the role of government and to freeing the private sector from regulatory
"shackles." The governments of Alberta and Ontario were indeed re-elected on
the basis of such a commitment. Particularly in Ontario, the public controversy
has translated into a barrage of legal challenges. Until very recently, however,
* We are very grateful to Anita Anand, Faculty of Law, Queen's University for assisting our
understanding of the way in which the Ontario Securities Commission and the various Self Regulatory
Organizations in the Ontario financial sector intersect for regulatory purposes. The general Canadian legal
literature in this domain is surprisingly slight. However, in writing this paper, we found useful the following:
Margot Priest, The Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-Regulation, 29 OTTAWA L.R. 233
(1997-98); Karen Beattie, Fairness, Openness and Self-regulation: An Examination ofAdministrative Law
Values and the Use of Voluntary and Self-regulatory Measures for Environmental Protection, 14 CAN. J.
ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 1 (2000); and Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L.REV. 813 (2000).
** Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law, Queen's University,
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the courts were rarely receptive to proceedings aimed at preventing the
government from carrying through with its policies.
This paper makes two broad inquiries: First, what role do Canadian courts
play in constraining government exercises of this kind? Second, how, if at all,
did or should public law adapt or respond to the new realities? We present two
general theses. First, the opportunities for using the courts to constrain
governments in the initiation of these policies have been, and may well
continue to be, very restricted. Only if the Supreme Court of Canada espouses
the philosophy that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is more of a
social charter than has generally been supposed will the door open to more
broad-based questioning of such government actions. Second, the prospects for
any dramatic reshaping of the general principles of public law as a means of
constraining the implementation of these policies and policing their possible
fallout are equally unpromising.
The first conclusion is based primarily on the absence to this point of any
strong or pervasive set of constitutional norms that operates to restrict
governments and legislatures in the legislative effectuation of mandates for
deregulation, privatization, and downsizing. The second hypothesis is founded
on the unwillingness of Canadian courts to provide a substantive check on the
exercise of executive power.' It is also derived in part from three rather
different and, to an extent, reassuring observations. First, in many instances,
the reconfigurations within government have not in reality taken the affected
areas outside of public law principles. Second, existing principles of general or
common law have at least some capacity to police the way in which a
"liberated" sector operates. Third, some domains of public law appear to
contain the potential for growth and, as such, have at least limited capacity for
providing extended bases for accountability when a new regime misfires in a
way that harms individuals.
1. See David J. Mullan, The Role of the Judiciary in the Review of Administrative Policy Decisions:
Issues of Legality, in THE JUDICIARY AS THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT: MANIFESTATIONS AND
CHALLENGES TO LEGITIMACY 313 (Mossman & Otis eds., 2000).
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I. THE STORY OF THE COURTS' INVOLVEMENT TO THIS POINT
A. The Limited Success of Preemptive Strikes
Most of the litigation arising out of government reform was commenced in
Ontario, with a view to preventing the Conservative government from carrying
through with its policies, and targeted the processes of restructuring the health
care, education, and municipal systems. As noted, the vast majority of these
challenges were singularly unsuccessful,2
In large measure, those who brought the actions relied upon principles of
judicial review of administrative action to attack the way in which the
government was proceeding. However, faced with broad legislative grants of
discretion, the Ontario courts were not disposed to deploy the general principles
governing review for abuse of discretion in Canadian law to question the
exercise of those powers by Ministers of the Crown or their delegates, such as
the Health Services Restructuring Commission, the body charged with the
reformation of the delivery of medical care in the province.3 Although some of
them may have disliked what was going on from a policy perspective, the
judges felt obliged to respect the purposes of the legislation as reflected both in
its overall structure and statement of objectives, and in its conferral of broad
statutory discretion. Only in relation to the government's early and frequent
use of so-called "King Henry VIII" clauses was there even a suggestion that
there might be an opportunity in an appropriate case to invoke a very inchoate
constitutional anti-delegation doctrine.4 In general, however, the substance of
the legislation and the manner of its implementation were beyond the judicial
ken.
Similarly, the courts were not at all inclined to burden the executive and its
delegates with extensive procedural obligations in the decisionmaking
processes attending the realization of legislative objectives. As reflected in
2. The only early successes were in cases involving failure to follow legally required process. See
Scarborough v. Ontario (Attorney Gen.), 32 O.R.3d 526 (Ont. Ct. 1997) (appointment of transitional trustees
for municipalities about to be amalgamated held to be ultra vires); Murphy v. Ontario (Attorney Gen.), 28
O.R.3d 220 (1996); Hewat v. Ontario, 37 O.R.3d 161 (Ct. App. 1998); Dewar v. Ontario, 37 O.R.3d 170 (Ct.
App. 1998) (each involving ultra vires dismissals of members of boards and tribunals).
3. The scene-setting judgment was that of Justice Archie Campbell in Pembroke Civic Hosp. v. Ontario
(Health Serv. Restructuring Comm "n), 36 O.R.3d 41 (Ont. Div. Ct. 1997).
4. "King Henry VIII" clauses are provisions in statutes whereby the executive is given authority to
dispense with observance or alter the terms of legislation. See Ontario Pub. Sch. Bd. Ass'n v. Ontario
(Attorney Gen.), 151 D.L.R.4th 346, 362-65 (Ont. Ct. 1997).
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general Canadian due process or procedural fairness law, the common law or
implied procedural obligations of those engaged in broad-based, polycentric
decisionmaking are quite limited. More particularly, in the absence of an
Administrative Procedure Act model for "notice and comment" in rulemaking
in all jurisdictions except Quebec,6 the courts have been unwilling to impose
such an obligation on a common law basis.7
Conscious of the constraints that accepted principles of legislative
sovereignty place on attacks on the exercise of statutorily delegated power,
some challengers attempted either to incorporate constitutional grounds into
their claims, or to base their claims entirely on such grounds. Claims were
based variously on the Constitution Act, 1867,8 and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. 9 Here too, however, until very recently, there was little
fertile ground; the challenges frequently foundered due to insufficient textual
support in the actual words of the Constitution. Thus, an attempt to prevent the
Ontario government from carrying through with the most spectacular example
of municipal amalgamation-the creation of a mega-city out of the existing
City of Toronto and surrounding cities and municipalities-failed on the basis
that the Constitution Acts contained no textual support whatsoever for the
proposition that municipalities had some kind of constitutional status in
Canadian law.' Similarly, invoking freedom of religion-guaranteed by
section 2(a) of the Charter--did not provide a basis for a claim that religiously-
affiliated hospitals operating within the public health system were exempt from
the downsizing and amalgamation objectives of the Health Services
Restructuring Commission."
5. See Pembroke Civic Hosp., 36 O.R.3d at 47; see also Wellesley Cent. Hosp. v. Ontario (Health Serv.
Restructuring Comm'n), 151 D.L.R.4th 706, 708 (Ont. Div. Ct. 1997).
6. Since 1986, the Quebec Regulations Act, S.Q., ch. 22, §§ 11-14 (1986) (Can.), has contained a "notice
and comment" procedure for proposed regulations.
7. See, e.g., Canadian Ass'n of Regulated Imp. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), 2 F.C. 747 (Ct. App. 1994).
8. 30 & 31 Vict., c.3 (Eng.), reprinted in R.S.C., app. II, no. 5 (1985) (Can.).
9. Constitution Act, 1982 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), sched. B, pt. I, ch. 11 (U.K.)
[hereinafter the Charter].
10. East York (Borough) v. Ontario (Attorney Gen.), 34 O.R.3d 789 (1997), aJfd. 153 D.L.R.4th 299
(Ont. Ct. App. 1997).
11. See Russell v. Ontario (Health Serv. Restructuring Comm'n), 114 O.A.C. 280 (1998), aff'd, 175
D.L.R.4th 185 (Ct. App. 1999).
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION
B. Signs of a Changing Judicial Environment?
Nonetheless, in the past few months, there have been some surprising (in
the light of the prior track record) successes based on constitutional arguments.
Given the unwillingness of the Ontario Court of Appeal to find any basis in
"freedom of religion" to keep religiously-affiliated hospitals open, Lalonde v.
Ontario (Commission de Restructuration des Services de Sant ) t2 was the first
of these surprises. There, the Court remitted a decision of the Commission
ordering a hospital in Ottawa to reduce drastically the services it was offering.
The hospital in question, H6pital Montfort, is a hospital that attends to the
health care needs of many of the large francophone community who live in
Canada's capital. As a dedicated francophone institution, it is unique not only
in Ottawa, but in the province.
In quashing the decision of the Commission and remitting the matter to the
Minister to be reconsidered in accordance with the principles identified in its
judgment, the Court relied extensively on four underlying principles of the
Canadian Constitution recently recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Reference re Secession of Quebec.13 Those principles, which the Supreme
Court stated could on occasion have free-standing operation outside the actual
text of the various Constitution Acts, were democracy, federalism,
constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the protection of minorities. In
Lalonde, the applicants for relief had seized on the last of these, claiming that
the Commission had disregarded the Hospital's status as an important
dimension in the vitality of Ottawa's minority francophone community. The
Court agreed and thereby opened a door that many had thought closed-the
ability to challenge the substance of the government's reorganization efforts,
not just by reference to the text of the Constitution, but also by reference to
underlying constitutional principles.
Leaving aside the controversial issue of the extent to which any appeal to
non-text based or "unwritten" constitutional principles on a free-standing basis
is justifiable,14 there are a number of reasons to be very cautious in treating
12. 56 O.R.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2001), aflg 181 D.L.R.4th 263 (Ont. Div. Ct. 1999).
13. Id. at 545-46 (citing Reference re Secession of Quebec, [ 1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (involving the question of
whether Quebec could secede from Canada and, if so, under what conditions)).
14. More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected an attempt to use the "unwritten principles" of
the Canadian constitution as a means of invalidating federal legislation that gave the executive branch
extensive ability to resist disclosure of information in the context of both administrative proceedings and
litigation. In delivering the judgment of the Court in Babcock v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2002] S.C.C. 57,
Chief Justice McLachlin stated: "The unwritten principles must be balanced against the principle of
2003]
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Lalonde as providing a broad basis for constitution-based attacks on
government engagement in restructuring and downsizing. First, the
circumstances of the hospital in question were unusual, and it is difficult to
think of many examples in which a court could comfortably rely on this or any
other of the four underlying principles to justify intervention in the
implementation of a government's restructuring mandate.' 5 Second, the Court
of Appeal took particular pains to point out that it was not deciding that the
Hospital was immune from legislative (as opposed to discretionary, executive)
closure. That question was left for another day. Third, there was textual
support for the review here-if not in the Constitution Acts directly, then in the
language and objectives of the Ontario French Language Services Act. 16 In
holding that the Commission had abused its discretion by failing to take
relevant considerations into account, the Court related the terms of the FLSA to
the underlying principles. Fourth and finally, though it now seems unlikely that
the Hospital will either close or reduce its operations significantly, the Court
order was not to the effect that the government was obliged to keep the Hospital
open. Rather, the Court directed the Minister to reconsider the whole issue in
accordance with proper principles. All of this suggests a precedent that may
provide little room for others disposed to challenge the ongoing implementation
of the government's commitment to its downsizing and privatization agenda.
In the context of welfare, health services, and education, however, there
remain some open questions as to the extent to which the government can
legitimately withdraw support from those domains. In part, those uncertainties
stem from the interdependent relationship that exists between the provinces and
the federal government. Thus, the Canada Health Act,' 7 under which the
federal government provides essential financial support for the maintenance of
provincial health care systems, presently operates as a severe constraint on the
extent to which provincial governments can privatize their health care systems
without jeopardizing funding. This is an issue of significant and ongoing
political controversy.' 8 Similar constraints are also operative with respect to
Parliamentary sovereignty." Id. 55. Though the precise meaning of this sentence is opaque, what is clear is
that the Court is issuing a strong caution against the ready use of such principles as a vehicle for challenging
legislation.
15. Again, it is cautionary in this regard to recall the earlierjurisprudence in this area. See supra notes 10-
II and accompanying text.
16. R.S.O., ch. F.32 (1990) (Can.) [hereinafter FLSA].
17. R.S.C., ch. C-6 (1985) (Can.).
18. See Katherine Chemiawsky, Enforcement of Health Care Rights and Administrative Law, 4 HEALTH
L.J. 35 (1996) (discussing legal issues surrounding the terms and enforcement of the provisions of the
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federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements in the fields of welfare and
education, as provided for in the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act.' 9
Beyond this, though, the possibilities for constitutional challenge have not yet
been exhausted.
Three judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as aspects of the
Court's general approach to equality issues under section 15 of the Charter,
provide ammunition for those challenging government cutbacks to forms of
basic support. The Supreme Court held, early on, that the Charter constrains
governments but not the private sector-at least not directly.20  It also
determined that, for these purposes, the mere fact that a decisionmaker derived
authority from a statutory source did not mean that that decisionmaker was part
of government and subject to the Charter. Thus, the Court refused to bring
state universities and hospital boards within the reach of the Charter in a series
of decisions challenging the mandatory retirement policies of those institutions.
They were, in their day-to-day operations, too autonomous of government to be
included.2'
Subsequently, in Eldridge v. British Columbia22 and in New Brunswick
(Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G (j),23 the Court refined its
position on what constituted government action for purposes of the application
of the Charter. Eldridge involved hospitals and the issue of inadequate funding
of services for the hearing-impaired in need of medical assistance and, in
particular, "translation" facilities. The Court held that bodies generally not
subject to the Charter could become subject to it when engaged in the
fulfillment of, or carrying out of, a specific government objective, policy, or
program. This definition included the actual delivery of medical services by
British Columbia hospitals. Moreover, the Court proceeded to hold that the
legislation). See also STANLEY H. HARTT & PATRICK J. MONAHAN, THE CHARTER AND HEALTH CARE:
GUARANTEEING TIMELY ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE FOR CANADIANS (2002), in which the authors argue that
if governments fail to deliver adequate health care, section 7 of the Charter and its protection of"life, liberty
and security of the person" provides a basis for arguing that statutory barriers to access to private health care
facilities are unconstitutional.
19. S.C. 1985, d F-8.
20. McKinney v. University of Guelph, [ 199013 S.C.R. 229, 232.
21. See, e.g., id.; Harrison v. University of British Columbia, [19901 3 S.C.R. 451, 452; Stoffman v.
Vancouver Gen. Hosp., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, 485. But see Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Ass'n v. Douglas
College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570.
22. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
23. [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46.
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Charter's equality guarantee was infringed by the absence of support for the
hearing-impaired.24
This judgment obviously has ramifications for outsourcing and
privatization in at least two ways. First, to the extent that a private operator is
nonetheless constrained by a government mandate or policy, the guarantees of
the Charter potentially reach the activities of that private operator. This will be
discussed in greater detail later. Secondly, in the domains of health and
welfare, whether within typically public or even some privatized realms, there
may be some basis for asserting not just a right to the continuation of certain
kinds of services, but also to the initial provision of those services. In Eldridge,
the springboard for such a claim was section 15 and the substantive equality
protection that the Court has extrapolated from that provision. 25
In the later case of G.(J)., the entry point was section 7 and the right to
"life, liberty and security of the person," and the concomitant right not to be
deprived of those rights save in accordance with the "principles of fundamental
justice., 26 The majority of the Supreme Court conceived of "security of the
person" as encompassing psychological integrity, and held that the state
deprived a mother of that right when it failed to provide for legal representation
of her interests upon applying for renewal of an order giving it custody of her
child.27 In the circumstances of this case, the state was obliged to ensure that
the mother had legal representation.
The third Supreme Court of Canada judgment that will undoubtedly have
an impact on challenges to government restructuring is Dunmore v. Ontario.
28
This case is particularly important given the extent to which many of the kinds
of exercise about which we are concerned will have a dampening effect on
organized labor and participation in mandatory collective bargaining. In
Dunmore, the Court, in what was a very clear change of direction from its
previous jurisprudence in this area,29 held that "freedom of association" under
section 2(d) of the Charter protected the right of agricultural workers in the
province of Ontario to organize collectively under the province's labor relations
24. Eldridge, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 682.
25. Id. at 680.
26. G.(J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. at 80.
27. Id. at 76, 96.
28. [2001] S.C.C. 94, 207 D.L.R.4th 193.
29. See, in particular, the so-called "labour trilogy" in which the Court was dismissive of the potential of
section 2(d) to protect collective bargaining rights. Reference re Pub. Ser. Employee Relations Act, [ 1987] 1
S.C.R. 313; Public Ser. Alliance of Can. v. Canada, [ 1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [ 1987] 1
S.C.R. 460.
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legislation. 30 As a consequence, a legislative amendment excluding them from
the benefits of the Act was unconstitutional and held not to be justifiable under
section 1.31 What is also interesting is the extent to which, in both its section
2(d) and section 1 analysis, the Court focused on the particular problems
related to agricultural workers' lack of economic bargaining power. In a sense,
the philosophy of the Court's jurisprudence under section 15 was brought to
bear in an analysis of the extent to which legislation prevented free association.
Putting it another way, the judgment also hinted at section 15 as a possible
source of protection in such cases.32
Obviously, it does not take much for poverty rights activists to see,
especially in Eldridge and G. (.), opportunities for the legal assertion of claims
to base-level benefits of various kinds. These decisions are at least suggestive
of the argument that the state cannot "downsize" by removing certain kinds of
support. It remains to be seen, however, how far the Supreme Court of Canada
is willing to push what is to this point a thin and situation-sensitive line of
jurisprudence.
Indeed, a number of concerns would need to be put aside for the Court to
go much further down this road. First, to the extent that many of these kinds of
cases involve the Court effectively ordering the government to spend money,
reorder budgetary targets, and even alter levels of taxation, it is to be
anticipated that there will be much hesitation on the part of some judges.33
Secondly, for the reach of section 15's equality provision to become truly
effective in this domain, the Court must accept poverty or lack of economic
status as a ground of disadvantage analogous to those listed explicitly in section
15: "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability." While this form of argumentation has worked, for
example, in the cases of sexual orientation and marital status,34 applying it to
economic status would require a significant extension. Thirdly, and similarly,
the Court would also have to give new dimensions to the scope of "life, liberty
30. Dunmore, 207 D.L.R.4th at 205.
31. Id. at 247.
32. Indeed, in her concurring judgment, Justice L'Heureux-Dub noted that she would also have found for
the agricultural workers on the basis of section 15, being prepared to hold that they were an analogous
category for the purposes of that section. Dunmore, 207 D.L.R.4th at 195-96.
33. For an example see Collins v. Canada [2000] 2 F.C. 3 (T.D.), affd [2002] 3 F.C. 320 (C.A.),
application for leave to the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed: [2002] S.C.C.A. no. 198
(P.L.).
34. Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (sexual orientation); Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418
(marital status).
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and security of the person" under section 7 and see it as embracing not just
some forms of psychological integrity, but claims to basic level subsistence
support as part of "security of the person." To this point, section 7 has typically
operated in the domain of criminal law and in certain forms of administrative
proceedings.35 Its substantive (as opposed to procedural) component has been
quite slight.36  Indeed, G.(J.) is in one sense part of that pattern. While it
provides a constitutionally guaranteed right to support, that right is asserted in
the context of the operation of the justice system and resistance to the power of
the state within that system. Thus, the case cannot be read as providing an
argument for state provision of legal aid or assistance in civil litigation between
private persons.
To this point, the authorities in support of this larger substantive role for
sections 7 and 15 are sparse. Thus, in Ferrel v. Ontario,3 7 a challenge to the
Conservative government's repeal of employment equity laws failed in the
Court of Appeal. The plaintiffs claimed that section 15 constrained the
government from repealing this legislation, which had been enacted by its
predecessor. This argument was rejected on the basis that the province's
Human Rights Code38 contained prohibitions on systemic discrimination in
employment and created a process by which victims could seek relief.
However, the Court also indicated very strongly that it did not see section 15 as
mandating the continuation of such legislation once it had been enacted. Under
this view, there would seem to be little room for using the Charter to compel
governments to preserve, let alone create, various social and economic
programs.
35. See, e.g., Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177. However, in the
wake of Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Comm 'n), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, the room for asserting
that a governmental authority has made a decision or otherwise acted in such a way as to deprive someone of
the right to life, liberty and security of the person seems quite truncated. See David J. Mullan & Deirdre
Harrington, The Charter and Administrative Decision-Making: The Dampening Effects of Blencoe, 27
QUEEN'S L.J. 879 (2002).
36. Initial Supreme Court of Canada recognition of section 7's substantive content occurred primarily in
relation to the adjectival aspects of the legal process, as exemplified by the foundation case of Reference re
Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, (R.S.B. C), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, and its condemnation of absolute
liability offences. However, it has now achieved a somewhat broader compass as exemplified by Regina v.
Morgentaler, [ 1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (with respect to the therapeutic abortion provisions of the Criminal Code),
and thejudgment of Justice La Forest in Godbout v. Longueuil, [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 (municipal restriction on
the engagement of employees who lived outside the boundaries of the City), subsequently endorsed by the
Court in Blencoe, [2000] 2 S.C.R 307.
37. 42 O.R.3d 97 (Ct. App. 1998).
38. R.S.O., ch. H.19, pt. I 5 (1990) (Can.); id., pt. IV 32.
THE IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION
However, there is presently a judgment under appeal in the Supreme Court
of Canada which raises these issues starkly. In Gosselin v. Quibec (Procureur
Gdndral),3 9 the validity of Quebec's social assistance laws is in question. More
specifically, the legal challenge questions the validity of offering a level of
welfare assistance that is not only below the norm but below subsistence-level
standards to those who are between the ages of eighteen and thirty and capable
of working. In addition to challenging the law by reference to section 15 and
age discrimination, the appellant in Gosselin is pleading that it violates section
7 in that the state must provide subsistence-level support as part of its
obligation to respect the "security of the person" of its citizens. Should the
Supreme Court sustain the latter argument, the decision will expand
enormously the reach of section 7.
In this context, two other recent judgments of the Ontario Court of Appeal
merit attention. In Falkiner v. Ontario (Director, Income Maintenance Branch,
Ministry of Community and Social Services),40 the Court struck down a
regulation that provided an overly expansive definition of what constituted a
"spousal" relationship in order to strike persons off the rolls of those entitled to
receive basic subsistence-level welfare assistance as a "sole support parent." In
so doing, the Court found that the regulation was discriminatory under section
15 of the Charter on a number of bases (sex, marital status, and receipt of social
assistance), and that the regulation could not be justified under section 1 of the
Charter. Aside from the judgment's effect in restoring many single mothers to
the status they possessed as welfare recipients prior to 1995, what is probably
most significant is the Court's recognition that, for the purposes of section 15,
receipt of social assistance was a category analogous to those listed specifically
in the section as designated beneficiaries of the Charter's guarantee of equality.
In terms of the capacity of section 15 to protect those on basic-level income
support, this is a dramatic evolution in the law. It now remains to be seen what
the Supreme Court of Canada has to say on this point in either, or both,
Gosselin and an appeal from Falkiner.4'
39. [1995] R.J.Q. 1033 (Ct. App.). The appellant failed in the courts of Quebec. Id. The Supreme Court
of Canada heard the appeal on October 29, 2001 and judgment is still under reserve. Gosselin v. Qu6bec
(Procureur G6n~ral), [1999] C.S.C.R. No. 364 (Que. Ct. App.) (Q.L.).
40. 212 D.L.R.4th 633 (Ct. App. 2000) (Q.L.), affg 188 D.L.R.4th 52 (Ont. Div. Ct. 2000). Notice of
appeal was filed August 12 2002. [2002] S.C.C.A. no. 297 (P.L.).
41. The case left open the issue of whether section 7 possesses a similar capacity to protect the rights of
welfare recipients to basic level support. Having found for the respondents on the section 15 issue, the Court
felt it unnecessary to move to consider the section 7 argument.
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Though of somewhat narrower ambit, the judgment of the Court of Appeal
in Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General)42 also provides a basis on which
federal programs that remove prior entitlements might be challenged. While
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides no explicit protection
for property rights, section 1 (a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 43 a so-called
quasi-constitutional statute applicable only in the federal domain, creates "due
process" protection in connection with the removal of property rights. This
provision has until now been pretty much a dead letter, but in Authorson, the
Ontario Court of Appeal invoked it to deny effect to a federal provision
depriving a group of disabled war veterans of the right to sue the government
for maladministration of pension monies that it had been holding on their
behalf.44 Once again, if this is upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, the
federal government may in the future be subject to some constraints on the
extent to which it may abolish programs and diminish economic entitlements.
What must be factored into any consideration of whether the Constitution
will provide protection against downsizing, privatization, outsourcing, and their
effects, however, is the role of section 1 of the Charter. This uniquely
Canadian instrument allows the government to justify what would otherwise be
violations of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter by reference to
whether those violations are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society. In addition, both section 33(1) of the Charter and section 2 of the Bill
of Rights permit legislative override of the rights guaranteed by sections 7 and
15. This override has been used very infrequently in the case of the Charter,45
in part because of the perceived political costs of engaging in such an exercise.
Despite previous reluctance, however, governments may become much more
willing to use the override clause the more the Court moves into the terrain of
economic and social rights by requiring the maintenance of programs and the
expenditure of significant funds. Of course, neither section 1 nor section 33(1)
affects constitutional rights asserted on the basis of underlying constitutional
principles or the Constitution Act, 1867. However, Lalonde notwithstanding,
42. 58 O.R.3d 417 (Ct. App. 2002) (Q.L.), a]j'g 53 O.R.3d 22 (Super. Ct. J. 2000). The Government has
filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 205 (Q.L.).
43. See Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Aug. 10,
1960, ch. 44, 1960 S.C. 519 (Can.).
44. Authorson, 58 O.R.3d at 455.
45. In the case of the Bill of Rights, there has generally been seen to be little need to resort to the override
given the very limited substantive impact of the Bill of Rights. Authorson may foreshadow a change of
attitude on that point.
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there seem to be only limited prospects for a very active jurisprudence
constraining government restructuring exercises on either of those bases.
What does give reason for optimism about an active role for the courts are
the other recent judgments in which courts have laid the foundation for an
expanded role for sections 7 and 15 in the policing of government cutbacks or
failures to provide services. Whether these cases remain isolated examples or
part of the development of a more comprehensive role for these provisions
remains to be seen. In our view, the outcome in Gosselin will almost certainly
be critical on this point.
II. PRIVATIZATION AND OUTSOURCING-REDUCING EXPOSURE TO LAW?
A. Introduction
There are many reasons for believing that at least some of the kinds of
downsizing and privatization exercises in which Canadian governments have
been recently engaged will not necessarily decrease the exposure of the relevant
fields to the reach of the law. Indeed, in some instances, there may be little or
no change in the application of relevant legal liability or accountability
principles.
By way of general introduction and illustration of this point, we take up
four examples: the privatization of liquor sale in Alberta; the ongoing
privatization of power generation, transmission, and distribution in Ontario; the
partial privatization of correctional facilities in Ontario; and the blending of
public (through the Ontario Securities Commission) and private (through Self
Regulatory Organizations) regulation in the Ontario financial services sector.
From there, we will examine certain general principles of common law that
may become of particular relevance in subjecting either government or private
operators to liability in the differently configured state. These are the principles
of nondelegable duties and liability for regulatory failure. We also consider the
extent to which there may be an increased role for "private attorneys general" in
the public law policing of the privatized and outsourced sectors and, indeed, in
the spurring into action of regulators.
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B. Canadian Examples of "Privatization " and Outsourcing
1. Sale ofLiquor in Alberta
One of the obvious targets of privatization has been the sale of liquor for
consumption off licensed premises, something that in all provinces (save
Quebec) was until recently the preserve of provincially owned retailers. As one
candidate in the recent Ontario Conservative Party leadership race so
graphically summarized the philosophy, if it is the kind of business that is in the
yellow pages of the phone book, the private sector, not government, should
almost invariably be doing it.46 In Alberta (though not to this point Ontario),
this philosophy led the Ralph Klein Conservative government to privatize the
sale of liquor very early on in its first mandate. However, it is one thing to
privatize an activity; it is another to deregulate it. Thus, at the same time that
the government gave up its monopoly, the relevant legislation47 also brought
the operation of privately owned liquor stores under the regulatory umbrella
that had theretofore covered the sale of liquor for consumption on premises by
bars, clubs, and restaurants.48
At one level, there is always the possibility that, in such a regime, private
sector marketers will be more accountable for poor service and defective
products than is the case with a government monopoly. Not only are the
private operators subject to the dictates of provincial human rights law and
other laws of general operation, but they hold their license at the sufferance of
the licensing authority. 49 Failure to adhere to the terms of the license can result
in cancellation or suspension, and the threat of invoking that process, in certain
situations, can be a much more powerful instrument of consumer rights
protection than is practically possible in the instance of the government
monopoly.
46. See Flaherty: Auctioneer of the Public Sphere, KINGSTON WHIG-STANDARD, Feb. 23, 2002 at 16.
Mr. Flaherty lost the leadership race.
47. Gaming and Liquor Act, R.S.A. ch. G-1 (2001) (Can.), available at http://www.qp.gov.ab.ca/
documents/acts/gO I.cfm.
48. See id., pt. III.
49. See id., pt. IV.
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2. Power Generation in Ontario50
For almost a century,5' Ontario Hydro, a publicly-owned utility, handled
much of the generation, transmission, and delivery of electricity in Ontario. All
of this changed dramatically in 1998 with the enactment of the Energy
Competition Act. 2 There were two schedules to that legislation. The first, the
Electricity Act, established the basis for a new competitive environment for the
generation and delivery of electricity in the province, while the second, the
Ontario Energy Board Act, revamped the province's regulatory regime.
Ontario Hydro was split into five successor companies, 3 with a view to
establishing a largely privatized (though still heavily regulated) electricity
sector in which the sale of electricity would take place on a competitive basis,
with prices set by the market rather than by the Ontario Energy Board. The
details of the program are complicated, but critical to the privatization agenda
are three principal actors: Ontario Power Generation, which at its inception
generated over eighty-five percent of the province's electricity at more than
eighty facilities; the new category of power retailers who buy electricity from
producers and other sources 54 and sell it on the now competitive market; and
Hydro One, which owns the transmission facilities that transfer electricity to
local substations and also a distribution network that sends electricity from
substations to homes and businesses. The government has ordered that, within
ten years, Ontario Power Generation sell off its assets to reduce its proportion
of the power generated in the province to less than thirty-five percent." In
50. Aside from the relevant legislation, much of the material in this section is derived from Jamie Swift,A
Shock to the System, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, REPORT ON BusINEss, Jan. 25, 2002, at 41, available at
http:llwww.robmagazine.com/febO2/ohydro.html, and KINGSTON WHIG-STANDARD April 27, 2002 at 5.
51. The Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario, Ontario Hydro's predecessor, came into existence
in 1906. Swift, supra note 41.
52. S.O., ch. 15 (1998) (Can.).
53. Though it is beyond the scope of this article, an explanation for the impetus behind the entire exercise
may emerge from an examination of the third of the new corporations, the Ontario Electricity Financial
Corporation, which is responsible for the $21 billion "stranded" debt of Ontario Hydro. Swift, supra note 41.
The extent of the utility's debt does much to explain why the exercise was undertaken in the first place, and
the transfer of much of that debt to this new Corporation was obviously aimed at ensuring that potential
buyers of various parts of the old utility would not be deterred by the specter of potentially crippling debt. Id.
However, the sale of Hydro One and other assets was the means by which the Government hoped to relieve
the public purse of some of that debt load.
54. By no means do they have a monopoly. Local utilities and major corporate users of electricity have the
capacity to and do buy directly.
55. Ontario Power Generation has already leased a number of its nuclear reactors to British Energy and is
now proposing to privatize safety analysis at its nuclear reactors. This will also involve a British company,
NNC Ltd., a subsidiary of British Energy. Paul Waldie, Reactor Safety Inspection To Be Privatized,
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addition, it was contemplated that Hydro One would be privatized through an
initial public offering to take place during 2002. As a result of litigation,56
those plans are now on hold and are being reconsidered.
Within this scheme, the regulatory environment also became more
complex. The Independent Electricity Market Operator (IMO), a non-profit
corporation, was created to police the competitive environment and to ensure
continuity of supply, and the Electrical Safety Authority, another non-profit
company, was established to set and ensure safety standards and to issue
certificates. Overseeing much of this activity is the reconfigured Ontario
Energy Board. Though it has lost its capacity to set prices through traditional
rate regulation, the Board remains responsible for ensuring competition in the
market and for overseeing its operation.
Without a doubt, these are major changes. However, even though rate
regulation by a utilities board is a thing of the past, the new environment is by
no means a deregulated one. Rather, the forms of regulatory control (and,
ultimately, judicial scrutiny) of the now fragmented industry have taken on a
different complexion. Moreover, the new legislation perpetuates the old
common-law public utilities principle that it is the duty of the utility to make
service available on a non-discriminatory basis. 57 In ensuring respect for that
principle, the Ontario Energy Board will undoubtedly have the capacity to
engage in ex-post facto scrutiny of pricing and access practices of the various
private and public actors who participate in the new environment. Indeed, that
role is further emphasized in section 1(c) of the Electricity Act, which calls
TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, July 11, 2002, available at http://www.electricityforum.com/news/jul02/
reactor.htm.
56. On virtually the eve of the IPO for Hydro One, two unions representing hydro workers-the Canadian
Union of Public Employees and the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union-successfully
challenged the privatization. See generally Payne v. Ontario (Minister of Energy, Sci. & Tech.), [2002] O.J.
No. 1450 (Super. Ct. J.) (Q.L.). The basis of the challenge was that the new Electricity Act, under which the
privatization exercise was supposed to occur, permitted the government only to hold and acquire shares in
Hydro One, but not to sell them. The legislation made no reference to selling the shares. The evidence
established that virtually every other privatization in Canada and Britain was backed by specific provisions
that enabled provincial and federal governments to sell shares in Crown corporations. An appeal from this
judgment was dismissed for mootness because the government introduced amending legislation providing the
necessary statutory authority for the IPO. Payne v. Ontario, O.J. No. 2566 (Ct. App. 2002) (Q.L.). However,
the litigation and the public furor generated by the whole proposal have caused the government to have second
thoughts and what will now happen to Hydro One remains a matter of conjecture. See Ontario Seeks Power
Partner, KINGSTON WHIG-STANDARD, July 6, 2002, at 1.
57. Electricity Act, S.O., ch. 15, sched. A § I(b) (1998) (Can.).
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upon the Board to "protect the interests of consumers with respect to prices and
the reliability and quantity of electricity service.
''58
Of course, there is no guarantee of the effectiveness or vigilance of this
new regulatory regime. However, it is worth noting that there has at least been
a resource commitment to this aspect of the process. According to one
commentator, the government has tripled both the staff and the budget of the
Ontario Energy Board since 1998.59 It is also worth noting that, while it was a
publicly-owned utility, Ontario Hydro operated largely at arm's length from
government. As a result, it enjoyed certain legal privileges not possessed by the
central branches of government, such as immunity from the jurisdiction of the
provincial Ombudsman and exemption from freedom of information
legislation. Not surprisingly, those immunities continue for the new and
reconfigured participants in the power industry.
3. Partially Privatized Correctional Services in Ontario
As noted earlier, in Eldridge, the Supreme Court extended the reach of the
Charter to those who were delivering or carrying out a specific government
program, such as the provision of state sponsored and funded medical services.
The scope of that extension remains unclear. However, it is doubtful that it
would cover the privatized sale of liquor, much less the supply of electricity,
particularly given the express recognition in the relevant legislation of the
public utility principle. Nonetheless, there is the possibility that, in the case of
those examples, the Charter no longer applies directly as a constraint on the
way in which private suppliers operate their businesses. The common law,
provincial human rights legislation, and any specific constraints in the statute or
imposed by the relevant regulators may have to do. However, with respect to
the third example, the partial privatization of correctional facilities, there seems
little or no doubt that the private operators will remain subject to the constraints
of the Charter in the way in which they deal with inmates or prisoners.
Not only is the physical confinement of the convicted seen as part of the
government's role even under the most minimalist conceptions of the role of
the state, but it is also at the core of section 7 of the Charter and its protection
of the right to "life, liberty and security of the person." As Justice La Forest
pointed out in his judgment for the Court in Eldridge, it would be odd indeed if
58. Id. § 1(c).
59. Swift, supra note 41, at 46.
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government, through the simple expedient of delegation or contracting out to
the private sector, could avoid its central Charter responsibilities.
60
Indeed, these considerations aside, the particular form of legislative model
that Ontario has chosen to permit the use of private correctional facilities
clearly bespeaks their operation under the dictates of specific government
policies. In the Ministry of Correctional Services Act,6 ' the contracting out of
responsibility for correctional services is established within the framework of
the overall purposes and policies of the Act. That all of the normal rights and
potential liabilities of inmates apply is reinforced by the application of the
regulations under the Act to privately- and publicly-operated facilities alike.
Section 57.1 states that the contractor and its employees "shall, for the purposes
of the Act, be deemed to be employed in the administration of the Act., 62 The
Act also specifies that privatized facilities shall continue to be subject to the
jurisdiction of the provincial ombudsman.63 There seems little reason then to
doubt that, like the hospitals in Eldridge, operators of these facilities are subject
to the dictates of the Charter.
One might also venture to suggest, though there is as yet no authority on
this point, that the actions of such operators, when taken under a specific
statutory power, would also attract the application of the province's Judicial
Review Procedure Act.64 In other words, they would be subject to public law
remedies for failing to live up to statutorily mandated standards governing
matters such as disciplinary hearings and the provision of required facilities. In
short, the legal world for those incarcerated in private prisons in Ontario may
have changed very little, if at all.
4. The Financial Services Blended Regulatory Model
a. Introduction-The Model
The model of regulation used in the financial services/securities sector
blends public and private control and involves government delegation of some,
but not all, control over capital markets. The relationship between the Ontario
60. Eldridge, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 657-60.
61. R.S.O., ch. M.22, pt. V.1 (2000) (Can.).
62. Id. § 57.1
63. Id. § 57.7.
64. R.S.O., ch. J.1 (1990) (Can.).
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Securities Commission (OSC) 65 and a stock exchange or a self-regulatory
organization (SRO) 66 is one in which the OSC retains control over financial
services through recognition and oversight while the stock exchange and the
SROs regulate the operation, standards, and business conduct of their members.
Through various powers specified in the Securities Act67--the power of
recognition, the power to attach conditions and terms on recognition, and the
power to intervene with respect to stock exchange and SRO bylaws, rules, and
regulations-the OSC retains control over the capital markets.
More specifically, Part VIII of the Securities Act sets out the model for self
regulation. An SRO is formed by the industry and applies to the OSC for
recognition. The OSC, pursuant to section 21.1 (1), may recognize the SRO if it
is satisfied that to do so would be in the public interest. 68 The OSC can also
impose terms and conditions on the recognition, pursuant to Section 21.1 (2).69
Once recognized, the SRO, in accordance with section 21.1(3), is responsible
for regulating the operations, the standards of practice, and the business
conduct of its members and their representatives. 70 This is done in accordance
with the SRO's bylaws, regulations, policies, procedures, practices, and
interpretations. Section 21.1(4), however, empowers the OSC to make any
decision with respect to any bylaw, rule, or regulation of an SRO if it is
satisfied that to do so is in the public interest. 7' The Securities Act contains
similar provisions with respect to the relationship between the OSC and stock
exchanges, with one additional provision. In section 21(5), the Act provides
that the OSC may, if it appears to be in the public interest, make any decision
with respect to four enumerated matters: a) the manner in which the stock
exchange carries on business; b) the trading of securities through the stock
65. Canada does not have a national securities regulator such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission.
66. In a very real sense, stock exchanges in Canada are SROs. However, they are treated separately for the
purposes of this discussion to the extent that in Ontario, the Stock Exchange is treated somewhat differently
under the legislation than is the case for other SROs such as the Investment Dealers Association and the
Mutual Fund Dealers Association. It should, however, be noted that Market Regulation Services has been
established as a subsidiary of the Toronto Stock Exchange with responsibility for the Exchange's SRO
functions-"to develop, administer, monitor, and enforce market integrity and market quality rules applicable
to trading." NEIL MOHINDRA, FRASER INSTITUTE CRITICAL ISSUES BULLETIN: SECURITIES MARKET
REGULATION IN CANADA 11 (2002).
67. R.S.O., ch. S.5, pt. VIII, § 21(1) (1990) (Can.).
68. Id. § 21.1(1).
69. Id. § 21.1(2).
70. Id. § 21.1(3).
71. Id. § 21.1(4).
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exchange; c) any security listed or posted for trading on a recognized stock
exchange; and d) issuers whose securities are listed or posted for trading on a
recognized stock exchange.72
b. Additional Regulatory Tools Available to the OSC
In addition to the powers and oversight described above, the OSC has
several regulatory tools available for use in regulating markets. It issues policy
statements, blanket orders and rulings, and notices to the industry. These tools
provide the OSC with power to regulate in a flexible and responsive manner.
The Securities Act, in section 143, grants the OSC the authority to make rules
that have the effect of regulations in respect of a range of fifty-six specified
matters.73 This rulemaking authority is coupled with mechanisms to provide
appropriate procedural safeguards and an opportunity for public participation.
Section 143.2(1) requires notice of any proposed rule and specifies the content
of such notice. On publication of a notice, the OSC must, in accordance with
section 143.2(9), provide stakeholders with a reasonable opportunity to make
written representations with respect to the proposed rule within a period of at
least 90 days after publication. Section 143.3(1) requires that the rule and
supporting documents be delivered to the Minister for approval. Fifteen days
after the approval, or on another date specified in the rule, the rule comes into
force (s. 143.4 (1)).
c. The Mutual Fund Dealers Association as an Example of an SRO
The Mutual Fund Dealers Association (MFDA), an SRO recently
recognized by the OSC, provides an illustration of the relationship between the
OSC and an SRO. The MFDA is responsible for regulating dealers selling
mutual funds. It exists to "enhance protection for investors who purchase
mutual funds from the more than 55,000 salespersons working for firms that
will be members of [the MFDA] ' '74 and to maintain public confidence in the
capital markets.
71
72. Id. § 21(5).
73. This provision was created in response to the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ainsley Fin.
Corp. v. Ontario Sec. Comm'n, 21 O.R.3d 104 (Ct. App. 1994), holding that, in the absence of specific
statutory authority, the OSC lacked the capacity to engage in rule-making.
74. MFDA Applies for Recognition as SRO, MFDA NEWS RELEASE, Jan. 17, 2000.
75. See SRO For Mutual Funds Distributors to be Established, MFDA NEWS RELEASE, Nov. 24, 1997.
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In November 1997, the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA)
and the Investment Funds Institute of Canada (IFIC) agreed on the
establishment and operation of the MFDA as a self-regulatory organization for
mutual fund distributors. The collaborative model is an SRO managed by the
IDA with shared governance and support, in principle, of the Canadian
Securities Administrators. The MFDA was incorporated as a non-profit
corporation, and established a board of directors, organizational structures and
committees, as well as policies and by-laws. In December 1999, the MFDA
applied to each of the Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia Security
Commissions for recognition.
On February 6, 2001, the MFDA was recognized in Ontario, subject to
certain conditions, by the OSC.76 Previously, on June 16, 2000, the OSC had
published the application for comment. After extensive consultation with the
industry and the public, the OSC considered the comments it received and
proposed certain recognition criteria. Accordingly, the MFDA, on December
18, 2000, filed a revised application for recognition as an SRO and was
subsequently recognized.
On the date of recognition, the OSC created Rule 31-506, titled "SRO
Membership-Mutual Fund Dealers," which was subsequently approved by the
Minister of Finance on April 6, 2001. Rule 31-506 requires all mutual fund
dealers to apply for membership in the MFDA within 30 days of the rule
coming into force, and to become members of the MFDA by July 2, 2002. A
dealer who is not a member of the MFDA from and after July 2, 2002 will be in
breach of securities laws. It may be inappropriate for a mutual fund dealer who
is not qualified to be a member of the MFDA to continue to act as a dealer,
and, as a result, a mutual fund dealer in this situation may have its registration
revoked.
Commission Rule 31-506 did not change OSC registration requirements.
The OSC did not delegate registration functions to the MFDA. A person or
company wishing to become a mutual fund dealer is still required to register
with the OSC, but will be subject to the additional requirement of membership
in the MFDA by no later than July 2, 2002. A person or company who applies
to the OSC for registration as a mutual fund dealer once the rule is in force
must file an application for membership with the MFDA on the same date it
files its application for registration with the OSC. If a mutual fund dealer does
76. Ontario Securities Commission, MFDA Recognition Order, Feb. 6, 2001, available at http://
www.mfda.ca/SRO-Recognition/OSC.Recognition.Order.pdf.
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not meet the relevant deadline to file the application it is in violation of
securities laws.
With recognition, the MFDA has received a degree of regulatory authority,
in accordance with section 21.1(3) of the Securities Act, to regulate the
operations and the standards of practice and business conduct of its members in
accordance with its bylaws, rules, regulations, policies, procedures,
interpretations, and practices. The MFDA has the power to enforce standards
and conduct investigations. A nineteen-page schedule describes the conditions
attached to the recognition.77 The conditions address matters including status
as a non-profit corporation, corporate governance, fees, compensation or
contingency trust funds, membership, compliance, and discipline of members.
Condition 9, titled "Due Process," provides that the MFDA shall ensure
that the requirements of the MFDA relating to admission, membership,
imposition of limitations or conditions on membership, denial of membership,
and termination of membership are fair and reasonable, including, with respect
to notice, an opportunity to be heard or make representations, the keeping of a
record, and the giving of reasons and provision for appeals. This due process
clause refers to fairness for its members, however, and not to fairness to the
public.
In fact, the MFDA rules, bylaws, and policies say little about accountability
to the public in the sense that they fail explicitly to extend due process
protections to those members of the public who might have complaints against
members. Condition 8 of the recognition requires the MFDA to notify the
OSC, the public, and the media of any disciplinary hearing of its members as
soon as practicable and within certain time lines before the hearing.
7 8
Notification of the disposition of any disciplinary hearing is also required. The
MFDA Rule Number 2, titled "Business Conduct,, 79 is as close to the idea of
fair process as any other provision in the rules, by-laws, conditions, and policy
statements come. Rule 2 simply requires all members to deal fairly, honestly,
and in good faith with clients; to observe high standards of ethics and conduct;
not to engage in any business conduct or practice that is unbecoming or
detrimental to the public interest; and to be professional and trained according
to relevant standards.8 0 Responsibility for acts and omissions rests with the
77. Id., sched. A.
78. Ontario Securities Commission, supra note 76, 8(D).
79. Rules of the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada, February 23, 2001, available at http://
www.mfda.ca/Rules/rules.pdf.
80. Id., Rule 2.1.1.
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individual MFDA member and not the MFDA.8' Each member organization is
encouraged to develop policies to ensure adherence to the MFDA standards,
rules, and policies.82 Nowhere is there mention of any duty owed to the public,
or of the process a member of the public is entitled to with respect to business
with mutual fund dealers.
However, clause 21 of By-Law No. 1 is titled "Review by Applicable
Securities Commission,"83 and provides that there is a right of appeal from a
decision of the MFDA to the OSC. Clause 27 states "Any Member, Approved
Person or other person directly affected" by a decision of the MFDA, of which
no further review or appeal is provided in the MFDA By-Laws, may request a
securities commission with jurisdiction in the matter under its enabling
legislation to review such a decision. The term "or other person directly
affected" obviously includes a member of the public. While there is no
mention of the MFDA's duty of fairness in its dealings with the public, there is
some mention of what a member of the public might do if it is dissatisfied with
a decision of the MFDA for which there is no further review or appeal.
Whether that opens up the possibility of a court reading in due process
protections for aggrieved members of the public remains to be seen.
d. SROs and Stock Exchanges and the Courts
Indeed, for these purposes, much may depend on the extent to which the
courts will now see the MFDA and other SROs operating under the umbrella of
the Ontario and other Securities Commissions as coming within the ambit of
the public law regime. The more extensive the degrees of legislative control,
securities commission regulation, and, most importantly, jurisdictional overlap
between or blending of the regulatory roles of the OSC and the SROs, the
stronger may be the arguments for the application of normal public law
principles to the way in which these SROs deal not only with their members,
but also with other constituencies affected by their operations. Application of
those principles would subject the SROs to the normal natural justice or
procedural fairness obligations of public law and to the remedies of public law
(in the case of Ontario, the province's Judicial Review Procedure Act).
81. Id., Rule 2.1.2.
82. Id., Rules 2.1.3(b) & 2.1.4(c).
83. By-Law No. I (as amended by By-Law No. 3) as enacted and confirmed February 23, 2001.
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Once again, the extent of the involvement of public law in the life of the
SROs remains unresolved by the courts, at least in the context of the current
regulatory environment. In 1992, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal determined
that public law remedies were not available with respect to the Investment
Dealers Association's exercise of disciplinary powers over one of its
members.84  However, that judgment preceded the current rather more
comprehensive blended or interconnected regulatory regime. What is also clear
is that, in this more integrated world of financial services regulation, the
capacities of the OSC and other securities commissions to deal with SROs on
the basis of public law principles have also been enhanced. In addition, as is
now the case with the Ontario Energy Board, the OSC possesses more financial
and personnel resources to enable it to perform this task, a result of the capacity
it now has to engage in total cost recovery from market participants.
C. Conclusions
The use of these four examples is not meant to assert that, in the face of
often fundamental changes in the role and nature of governance in certain
critical domains, all will remain constant in the world of the law, both private
and public. That is clearly not the case. However, what we suggest here is that
there may be fewer changes and less diminution of citizen protection than is
sometimes assumed. The examples are also intended to illustrate that the
change from public to private comes in very different forms. For purposes of
legal accountability and any assessment of the effects or impact of change,
close attention must therefore be paid to the detail of each particular exercise.
More generally, however, what a number of the examples clearly demonstrate
is that privatization and deregulation do not go hand in hand. Indeed,
privatization in many contexts will mean new or expanded state regulatory
capacity. Further, though the jurisprudence to support this is still developing,
there is every possibility that certain kinds of outsourcing or sharing of
responsibilities between the public and the private sector may well have the
effect of bringing the implicated private sector operators or actors within the
realm of the public law system or regime.
84. Ripley v. Pommier (No. 2), 108 N.S.R.2d 38 (App. Div. 1991).
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III. AN INCREASED OR CHANGING ROLE FOR SOME PUBLIC LAW
PRINCIPLES
A. Introduction
As mentioned in the general introduction, the prospects appear slim, at least
in the short term, for any dramatic change in general public law principles as a
means of responding to the phenomena with which this paper is concerned.
However, there are particular areas of public law where opportunities may arise
for asserting claims based on the dislocative effects of the initiation and
implementation of government initiatives. Thus, Michael Taggart, writing
primarily about developments in New Zealand, has speculated about the
prospects for a resurgence and evolution in the common law principles
85governing the operation of public utilities. To the extent that market entry or
licensure in certain domains has now become the preserve of the private sector,
the parallels between judicial control of private and public bodies, particularly
by reference to concepts of authority or jurisdiction and procedural fairness,
may also be exploited by those adversely affected by the exercises of such
86power. In the balance of this paper, we concentrate on three other areas of
law where opportunities may exist for courts to impose some measure of
accountability.
The first two examples are taken from the law governing the tortious or
delictual liability of public authorities: the principles of nondelegable duties
and liability for regulatory negligence or failure. The first may be particularly
relevant in the context of outsourcing, and the second in the context of transfer
from state to private-sector operation subject to regulation. However, our
conclusion is that, for a number of reasons, the degree of protection provided
under these two principles will not be great and will, in any event, tend to be
haphazard or random rather than all-embracing. We then turn our attention to
another mechanism that may permit citizens and groups more successfully to
use the courts as a forum for subjecting at least some aspects of this changed
85. See Michael Taggart, Public Utilities and Public Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 214 (P.A.
Joseph ed., 1995); see also Michael Taggart, Corporatisation, Privatisation, and Public Law, 2 PUB. L. REV.
77 (1991). But see Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses to Privatisation and Outsourcing, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40, 45-50 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE PROVINCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW].
86. David Mullan explores this theme in more detail in Administrative Law at the Margins, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 85, at 134.
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world to legal constraints and discipline: private enforcement of regulatory
standards. We discuss this possibility in the knowledge that this would require
a reevaluation by the Canadian courts of their traditional antipathy to those who
seek public interest standing against regulators who have not been sufficiently
vigilant in the enforcement of regulatory standards or, as a surrogate for the
regulator, against those not complying with legislated or regulator imposed
standards.
B. The Concept of "Nondelegable Duty"
The common-law concept of"nondelegable duty" has the potential to play
an expanded role in an environment in which government relies increasingly on
private entrepreneurs and institutions to deliver various forms of government
services. This concept has been used successfully in tort law to find
government, both central and municipal, liable for the negligent acts of
independent contractors. The theory behind the principle of nondelegable
duties is that where the state privatizes responsibilities for the delivery of
government services, legal responsibility nevertheless remains with the state.
1. An Exception to the General Rule
The concept of "nondelegable duty" is an exception to "[t]he general rule at
common law.., that a person who employs an independent contractor will not
be liable for loss flowing from the contractor's negligence. ,87 In accordance
with this general rule, an employer is not liable for harm flowing from the
contractor's negligence as long as the employer was not negligent in hiring and
in supervising the contractor and did not hire the contractor to do something
unlawful. Notwithstanding this general rule, however, the common law
recognizes that where a "nondelegable duty" is involved, an employer is not
absolved from liability by engaging an independent contractor.
2. Nondelegable Duty Described
The term "nondelegable duty" captures the idea that where the legislature
has entrusted someone with a power to do something, and that person delegates
the performance of the work to a third party, the person legislatively entrusted
87. Lewis (Guardian ad Litem) v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1145 49 (McLachlin, J.,
concurring).
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with the power remains legally responsible for discharging the duty of care,
whether employees or independent contractors are the means for exercising the
power. The work may be delegated, in other words, but not the duty.
In Lewis (Guardian ad Litem oj) v. British Columbia,88 then-Justice
McLachlin traced the concept of nondelegable duty back to Pickard v. Smith 9
and to Lord Blackburn in Dalton v. Angus,90 who described the concept in the
following way:
[A] person causing something to be done, the doing of which
casts on him a duty, cannot escape from the responsibility
attaching on him of seeing that duty performed by delegating
it to a contractor. 9'
3. The Leading Canadian Case on "Nondelegable Duty"--Lewis
(Guardian ad Litem of) v. British Columbia92
In Lewis, the leading Canadian case on the concept of nondelegable duty,
the provincial Crown of British Columbia had employed an independent
contractor to remove dangerous rocks beside a highway. There was no dispute
that the contractor's negligence in failing to remove a rock caused the rock to
fall on the highway and to kill the driver of a car. The issue was whether
because it had engaged an independent contractor to do the work, the
respondent British Columbia Ministry of Transportation and Highways was
absolved of liability. A unanimous Supreme Court of Canada found the
provincial Crown liable for the negligence of the independent contractor, on the
basis of nondelegable duty.
The Court began by establishing that there was a duty of care owed by the
Ministry to the traveling public. The Courts had previously recognized a duty
of care between the Ministry and highway users.93 The Court then considered
the nature and extent of the duty and concluded that it was nondelegable.
Therefore, the respondent Ministry was liable for the negligence of the
independent contractor. The relevant factors on which the Court found a
88. [199713 S.C.R. at 49.
89. 10 C.B. (N.S.) 470, 142 E.R. 535 (1861).
90. 6 App. Cas. 740 (1881).
91. Id. at 829.
92. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1145.
93. Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228.
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nondelegable duty were (1) the statutory powers granted to the Crown and (2)
policy considerations, including the reasonable expectations of highway users.94
a. Statutory Powers Granted to the Crown
The Supreme Court of Canada found that, by means of two statutes, the
legislature had assigned paramount authority and direction for highway repairs
and maintenance to the Ministry. The applicable statutes were the Highway
Act 95 and the Ministry of Transportation and Highways Act (MTHA).96 The
former statute, in section 33(1), vested the Ministry with "control of the
construction and maintenance of every arterial highway., 97 The latter statute,
in section 48, provided that, "[t]he minister shall direct the construction,
maintenance and repair" of all highways. 98 Section 14 of the MTHA provided
that "[t]he minister has the management, charge and direction of all matters in
relation to the acquisition, construction, repair, maintenance, alteration,
improvement and operation of... highways." 99 The Court concluded that this
statutory authority, when exercised, gave rise to a duty to perform that work
with reasonable care. 1° The Court noted no specific statutory exclusion from
the duty that arose from the authority to manage, control and direct the repair
and maintenance of the highways.
The Court considered the circumstances within which the government
exercised its statutory authority. Because the circumstances in Lewis involved
the safety of the public, the Court concluded it would be fair to hold the
Ministry liable for the negligence of the independent contractor. The Court
wrote:
It is but fair that when a public authority exercises the
statutory authority and power granted to it in circumstances
which may have serious consequences for the public interest
that it be held liable for a breach of duty occasioned by the
negligent acts of its contractor. In those circumstances, it is
94. Id. at 1236-47.
95. Highway Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 167 (1979) (now R.S.B.C., ch. 188 (1996)) (Can.).
96. Ministry of Transportation and Highways Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 280 (1979) (now R.S.B.C., ch. 311
(1996)) (Can.) [hereinafter MTHA].
97. R.S.B.C., ch. 167 s.33(1) (now R.S.B.C., ch. 188, s. 30(1)) (Can.).
98. R.S.B.C., ch. 280, s.48 (now R.S.B.C., ch. 311, s.22) (Can.).
99. R.S.B.C., ch. 280, s.14 (now R.S.B.C., ch.188, s.12) (Can.).
100. Lewis, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 23.
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both appropriate and just to hold a public body ultimately
responsible for ensuring that reasonable care is taken in the
work necessary to carry out its authority.10 1
b. Policy Reasons, Including the Reasonable Expectations of
Highway Users
The Court found it logical and reasonable to assume that highway users
look to the government to take reasonable care in the construction and
maintenance of provincial highways, and that they would expect the Ministry to
be responsible for the negligence of its contractors. 02 The Court relied on a
case decided by the Australian High Court, Kondis v. State Transport
Authority,10 3 in which Justice Mason stated:
[I]t appears that there is some element in the relationship
between the parties that makes it appropriate to impose on the
defendant a duty to ensure that reasonable care and skill is
taken for the safety of the persons to whom the duty is owed..
In these situations the special duty arises because the person
on whom it is imposed has undertaken the care, supervision or
control of the person or property of another or is so placed in
relation to that person or his property as to assume a particular
responsibility for his or its safety, in circumstances where the
person affected might reasonably expect that due care will be
exercised.
The Court found that the particular vulnerability of the traveling public was
a significant factor in concluding that the government could not escape liability
for negligent repair work by delegating it to an independent contractor. The
traveling public is not in a position to assess the contract for construction work,
and it should be able to look to the Ministry as the entity responsible for taking
reasonable care in carrying out repairs and maintenance of the roads. Because
101. Id. 24.
102. Lewis, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 32.
103. 154 C.L.R. 672, 687 (1984) (Austl.) cited in id.
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the Ministry is in complete control of repair and maintenance, the public should
be able to depend on the Ministry for the reasonable performance of the work.
Broader policy reasons supported a finding of a nondelegable duty owed by
the Ministry. The Court found it unfair for a person injured on the road due to
a contractor's negligence to have to seek out the identity of the contractor
responsible in order to bring an action, and to trust that the contractor is
financially responsible.10 4 Where more than one contractor is involved in road
work, it would be unfair for the member of the public to search out the
responsible contractor(s).' 05 Moreover, the Court wrote that "it cannot be
forgotten that the Ministry is in complete control of this work. It is the Ministry
that lets contracts for the work to be performed.' 0 6 The Ministry, the Court
suggested, could arrange for indemnification from the contractor. 107
In the companion case to Lewis, Mochinski v. Trendline Industries Ltd., 08
the Supreme Court of Canada held that for the reasons set out in Lewis, the
British Columbia Ministry of Transportation and Highways was liable for the
injury causing negligence of an independent contractor in performing road
maintenance work.
4. Nondelegable Duty in Canada after Lewis
The concept of nondelegable duty may arise in various situations. In
Lewis, the Court adopted a "principled approach dependent on the
circumstances of the case at hand, to determine when a nondelegable duty
should be imposed."' 1 9  Three companion cases involving the issue of
nondelegable duty are currently under reserve in the Supreme Court of Canada,
waiting to be inscribed for hearing. In each of these cases, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal split two to one on the issue of whether the
provincial Crown was liable on the basis of breach of non-delegable duty.
These cases provide further examples of circumstances in which a
nondelegable duty might arise. They also illustrate that the concept of
"nondelegable duty" is not clear-cut, and that there is disagreement about when
such a duty arises.
104. Lewis, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 35.
105. Id.
106. Id. 136.
107. Id. 37.
108. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1176.
109. Lewis, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 54.
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Two of these cases, B.(KL.) v. British Columbia"° and B.(M.) v. British
Columbia,"' involve actions for damages brought by plaintiffs against foster
parents and the Province for sexual assaults they allegedly experienced while
placed as children in foster care homes. Two judges of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, Justices Prowse and MacKenzie, held in each case that the
Province was responsible for the torts of the foster parents on the basis of
nondelegable duty." 12 They held that the trial judge erred in using the concept
of vicarious liability to analyze the fault of the foster parents. Because the role
of foster parents with respect to the Crown was more properly characterized as
that of an independent contractor than that of an employee, the preferable
analysis was that of nondelegable duty. The two appellate judges held the
Crown liable on the basis of breach of nondelegable duty to care for children
for whom it was the legal guardian. This duty could not be delegated to an
independent contractor; the Province could not satisfy its duty of care by
delegating the care of children to others. In B.(M.), Justices Prowse and
MacKenzie found a nondelegable duty on the part of the Superintendent of
Child Welfare to ensure that due care was taken of the plaintiff while in foster
care, and held that the Superintendent had breached that duty. The
Superintendent could not escape responsibility for ensuring that his duties were
carried out properly simply because the Protection of Children Act' 13 permitted
the Superintendent to appoint others to act for him in carrying out his duties.
The remaining appellate judge, Chief Justice MacEachern, found in both
cases that the legislation did not impose a nondelegable duty on the Crown. In
B.(M.), he held that the Superintendent did what the Act expected and
authorized him to do, that is, place a child in a family home-a situation in
which there were always risks." 4 The provision did not guarantee safety. He
further held that without more specific legislative direction and precise
statutory wording, the statute did not impose a nondelegable duty upon the
Superintendent to pay damages for all harm done by others to a child in foster
care. 115
110. 197 D.L.R.4th 431 (B.C. Ct. App. 2000).
111. 197 D.L.R.4th 385 (B.C. Ct. App. 2000).
112. In B.(K.L.), a limitation period barred recovery. B.(K.L.), 197 D.L.R.4th 431.
113. Protection of Children Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 303 (1960) (Can.).
114. B.(M.), 197 D.L.R.th at 148.
115. Id. 151, 158.
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The third of the companion cases, G.(E.D.) v. Hammer,' 6 involves an
action for damages brought by a student against a school board for sexual
assault by a school janitor over a two-year period at an elementary school. The
janitor reported to a custodial operations manager of the school board. The trial
judge, Judge Vickers, found against the janitor, but dismissed the action against
the school board."
17
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, on a two to one basis, dismissed the
student's appeal. Justice MacKenzie and Chief Justice MacEachem decided
that the claim based on nondelegable duty should fail because the tort was
committed outside the course and scope of employment."1 8 They held that
because there was no vicarious liability, there could be no liability for breach of
nondelegable duty." 9 In their view, if a claim for vicarious liability fails
because the employee's tort was committed outside the course and scope of
employment, then any claim for breach of a nondelegable duty of the employer
must also fail. 120 They held that the rationale for breach ofnondelegable duty is
to extend liability for torts of independent contractors in appropriate cases
where there would be vicarious liability if the independent contractor were an
employee. 12' They noted that, in Lewis, the liability of the Crown was for the
negligence of an independent contractor and therefore there was no
employment relationship that would have allowed a claim for vicarious
liability. 2 2 In the foster parent cases, the foster parents were contractors and
not Crown employees. They concluded that they were not aware of any case
where liability for breach of a nondelegable duty has been entertained for the
tort of an employee where vicarious liability for the employee's tort has been
rejected. 123
The dissenting appellate judge in G.(E.D.), Justice Prowse, found that
liability should lie against the school board on the basis of a nondelegable
duty. 12 4 The Public Schools Act12 5 gave the school board de facto supervisory
116. 197 D.L.R.4th 454 (B.C. Ct. App. 2000).
117. Id. at 472.
118. Id. at 476.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 476-77.
124. Id. at 474.
125. The Public Schools Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 319 (1960),amended and replaced by School Act, R.S.B.C., ch.
375 (1979) (Can.).
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powers over the schools in its district, including the power to hire and fire
support staff. Prowse wrote that the Public Schools Act gave the Minister of
Education charge of the maintenance and management of all provincial schools
established under the Act. 2 6 Children were statutorily compelled to attend
school and abide by the direction of the teacher. The school board had a
nondelegable duty to ensure that reasonable care was taken for the safety of
those children while on school premises. The student was victimized by a
person hired by the board, the very entity charged with the responsibility to
provide a safe learning environment.
127
In response to the reasoning of her colleagues on the issue of vicarious
liability and its relationship to nondelegable duty, Justice Prowse stated that
there was a significant difference between breach of nondelegable duty and
vicarious liability. 28 Breach of nondelegable duty is a direct form of liability,
whereas vicarious liability is an indirect form of liability. Additionally, breach
of nondelegable duty focuses on the breach by an employer of its personal duty
to the victim, whereas vicarious liability focuses on the indirect responsibility
of an employer for the acts of its employees.
a. Limits of the Concept of Nondelegable Duty
Although the concept of nondelegable duty may be invoked more
frequently than in the past, as a consequence of increases in outsourcing, it does
have its limits. First, the applicable statute must indicate that the respondent's
duty to take reasonable care cannot be satisfied by delegating the work to an
independent contractor. At the very least, a statute must assign authority to a
Ministry. Arguably, the legislative grant of power must specifically and
precisely grant power and authority to the relevant Minister. The more precise
and specific the legislative grant is in granting paramount authority and control
to the Minister, the more likely there will be agreement that a nondelegable
duty may exist. The foster care cases illustrate this point. Chief Justice
MacEachern, in dissent, did not find the wording of the Protection of Children
Act precise or specific enough to lead to a conclusion of a nondelegable duty
on the part of the Superintendent of Child Welfare. His colleagues, on the
126. Id. at 472-73.
127. Id. at 458-59.
128. G.(E.D.), 197 D.L.R.4th at 30.
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other hand, found the assigned responsibility broad enough and specific enough
to lead to a nondelegable duty.
Provided that a clear legislative grant of authority exists, the facts must also
give rise to a duty of care, either recognized at law or worthy of recognition at
law, as prescribed by the test in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council.2 9
Only where this has been established can one step back and assess whether the
legislative grant is one which imposes a nondelegable duty on the government.
As indicated by Lewis, the courts will consider the circumstances in which the
government exercised its statutory authority. Specifically, the court will
consider whether they involve matters such as public safety or other serious
consequences for the public interest.
Second, policy reasons, including the reasonable expectations of the public
in question, must indicate that the duty should remain with the government. As
Lewis illustrates, analyzing this question involves consideration of the
particular vulnerability of the public in question. In addition, as evidenced by
the judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Lewis, the
Courts are concerned that a finding of nondelegable duty may, in some
circumstances, amount to rendering the government in question an insurer for
the negligence of the independent contractor.
It is true that a government aware of the principle of nondelegable duty
may avoid liability by adding an indemnification clause in its contract with the
independent contractor. Under such an arrangement, however, the government
would remain the responsible and liable party; the contractor would simply
indemnify the government for its losses. This is not problematic. What is
problematic for accountability and fairness is the ability of a government,
recognizing that a grant of power may lead to a nondelegable duty, to draft its
statutes to avoid such a finding. It might do this by ensuring that there is no
clear legislative grant of authority to government, thus shielding itself from the
principle of nondelegable duty, or it might do this by a straightforward
legislative exclusion of the possibility.
In terms of the examples dealt with in this paper, it is useful to reflect on
whether the government retains responsibility for any of the relevant activities
on the basis of nondelegable duty, rather than on the basis of the Charter or its
role as regulator of the now privatized sector. In the case of power generation,
transmission, and delivery in Ontario, the situation is by no means clear-cut.
129. [19781 A.C. 728 (H.L.) (U.K.).
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While the entire restructuring is one that has as its objective a significant
diminution in the responsibility of the government, at least in the short term, the
enterprise continues to involve a blend of public and private sector
responsibilities. For the present, both Ontario Power Generation and Hydro
One remain under the effective control of the government, even though they are
both commercial companies. Moreover, the government is entitled to acquire
shares in each of these corporations. 3  In addition, the IMO, while a
corporation in legal form, is in fact a without-share, nonprofit regulator.
Section 1 of the Electricity Act, in its statement of purposes, also contains
evidence of continuing government responsibility for the overall functioning of
the industry. Thus, as seen already, it promises "protection of the interests of
consumers with respect to prices and the reliability and quality of electricity
service.'
13 1
On the other hand, the Act specifies in relation to each of Ontario Power
Generation, 32 Hydro One, 133 and the IMO 134 that they are not agents of the
Crown for any purpose. By and large, they function as independent entities,
and the contemplation is that it will reduce dramatically its holdings in
generation plants, while Hydro One remains a candidate for either total or
partial privatization. It may also not be advisable to place too much emphasis
on specific objectives in the legislation's specification of purposes. Protection
of the public interest is, not surprisingly, a stated objective of most regulatory
statutes, and does not mean that those who participate in the regulated industry
or activity are engaged in performing a nondelegable duty. Indeed, in the case
of the Electricity Act, it is probably more appropriate to treat the consumer
protection aspirations of the Act as directed to the various regulators, including
the revamped Ontario Energy Board. Moreover, to the extent that Section I
also speaks of facilitating competition, a smooth transition to competition,
35
and promoting economic efficiency in the industry, 36 the indicators are
obviously in the other direction; this is primarily a privatization exercise in
which the government is shedding itself of previous responsibilities.
130. Electricity Act, S.O., ch. 15, § 53(2) (1998) (Can.) (Ontario Power Generation); § 50(2) (Hydro One).
The government can also take securities in IMO. Id. § 17(1).
131. Id. § l(c).
132. Id. § 53.1(2).
133. Id. § 48(2).
134. Id. § 6.
135. Id. § I(a).
136. Id. § l(d)
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The structure of the Act also is one that stresses the autonomous nature of
the relevant corporations. Certainly, as noted already, the government can
acquire shares in two of the corporations. As well as being obliged to report to
the Minister annually, 37 all three can be required to submit additional reports at
any time. 38 However, there is no sense at all in which the Minister or the
government is involved in the day-to-day running of any of the three
corporations, or even on an occasional basis through the use of a directive
power. In short, in terms of one of the key indicators of whether a
nondelegable duty is involved-the relevant statute's support of abiding
ministerial or government responsibilities-this case seems to present a strong
counter-example against the existence of any nondelegable duties. Our view,
therefore, is that this concept is not likely to be one that plays any role in
disciplining the functioning of the reconfigured markets for electricity in the
province.
With respect to correctional services in Ontario, as discussed, the
government of Ontario has chosen partial privatization within the framework of
the already established public correctional system. For this reason, there very
likely remains a nondelegable duty on the government with respect to
correctional services. The Ministry of Correctional Services Act, 139 in section
4, assigns responsibility for the administration of the Act, and therefore for
correctional services, to the Minister of Correctional Services. section 57.7 of
the Act deems a contractor to be a government organization for the purposes of
the Ombudsman Act, 40 and section 57.8 states that the statute prevails over any
contract. Clearly, the legislature has engaged in this partial privatization with
knowledge of the implications of not allowing Charter protections in the
correctional setting and with a desire to ensure the protection of the broader
public interest, as well as the interests of inmates, in private-sector operation of
correctional institutions.
As to the privatization of the sale of liquor in Alberta: as discussed, it is
one thing to privatize an activity and quite another to deregulate it. Because the
Alberta government did not deregulate sales, the Alberta Gaming and Liquor
Act applies to sales in private retail outlets as well as to sales in Alberta Liquor
Control Board stores. The statute grants authority to the Gaming Commission,
137. Id. §§ 53.4(1), 50.4(1), 21(1).
138. Id. §§ 53.4(4), 50.4(4), 22.
139. R.S.O., ch. M-22 § 4 (1990) (Can.).
140. Id. § 57.7.
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in section 3(d), "to control . . . the manufacture, import, sale, purchase,
provision, storage, transport, use and consumption of liquor." Nonetheless, this
retention of regulatory control over the privatized sector in no sense brings the
exercise of the license or the franchise within the realm of activities subject to
the principle of nondelegable duty. The privatized operators are not fulfilling a
statute that imposes a duty on government. In such a context, once again, the
only basis for imposing tort liability on the government is by establishing a duty
of care running from the vendors of liquor to the general drinking public, and
further to establish that that duty of care has been breached as a result of
regulatory failure which has caused harm. That is the issue to which we now
turn.
C. Tort Liability for Regulatory Failure
Canadian law has long recognized that, in certain situations, tort liability
can flow from regulatory negligence. Thus, in the leading judgment of City of
Kamloops v. Nielsen,14 1 the Supreme Court of Canada held a municipality
accountable for regulatory negligence in administering the granting of building
permits. Indeed, in that case, the Court was not deterred by the fact that the
claim in question was, in effect, one for economic loss as opposed to physical
harm to person or property. Moreover, in the domain of licensing agencies,
which we more typically regard as regulators, there is case law to the effect
that, provided the usual conditions can be met, a negligent licensing authority
may be liable to those who suffer damage to person or property. Thus, in
Swanson Estate v. Canada,142 the Federal Court of Appeal held Transport
Canada liable to the estates of victims of an air crash for failing to ensure that
an airline and its pilots complied with the terms and conditions to which they
were subject in the operation of an airline licensed by the Canadian Transport
Commission.
Read expansively, these and other authorities might suggest considerable
scope for imposing liability on the government for the actions of those
enterprises which it has "franchised" or licensed to engage in certain activities
subject to conditions and various forms of regulation. Even where there is no
room to invoke the principle of nondelegable duty, more general concepts of
141. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 (1984).
142. 80 D.L.R.4th 741 (Fed. Ct. App. 1991).
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tort liability might provide a basis on which the government or regulator could
be held accountable.
Aside from the fact that at least some governments have attempted to ward
off the expansion of this form of liability through legislative exclusion or
limitation, 43 the courts themselves have been hesitant to extend the reach of
such principles of liability. Thus, in the leading Supreme Court of Canada
cases, it has always been accepted that such liability can be invoked only in the
domain of operational-and not policymaking-activities, a distinction that has
proved quite troublesome from time to time.' 44 There have also been
considerable doubts as to the extent to which such principles of liability have
any application to regulators that are obliged to act in a judicial manner when
exercising their powers. 145 Thus, it is significant in Swanson Estate that the
defendant was not the Canadian Transport Commission, which acted in a
judicial-type capacity in granting a license to the relevant airline, but rather
Transport Canada, which was thereafter responsible for the day-to-day
supervision of the airline's operations. 46  In the same manner, there is
considerable doubt as to whether the Alberta Gaming Commission, which
holds hearings in determining whether to grant, suspend or cancel a license,
would be amenable to a claim of regulatory negligence. Also, Nielsen
notwithstanding, the scope for asserting this kind of liability against those
engaged in economic regulation of various kinds has been very uncertain.
Finally, and more generally, the Courts have from time to time limited access to
this kind of claim by reference to the need to establish a duty of care. '47 The
concept of duty of care has been quite fluid in this domain, mainly as a result of
judicial acceptance of overriding policy concerns as a basis for negating
liability in situations where a duty of care would otherwise have existed.
The weight of these concerns and exceptions has very recently been
reinforced by two companion appeals decided by the Supreme Court on the
same day in late 2001. Faced with arguments for a more general principle of
143. See, e.g. the Alberta Safety Codes Act, S.A., S-0.5, s. 12 (1991) (Can.), which immunizes (save in the
case of bad faith) the province, municipalities, and accredited agencies from tort liability for a range of
inspection and evaluative functions.
144. Compare, for example, Just v. British Columbia, [ 1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, with both Brown v. British
Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways), [ 1994] 1 S.C.R. 420, and Swinamer v. Nova Scotia
(Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445.
145. See Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, [1971] S.C.R. 957.
146. See Swanson Estate, 80 D.L.R.4th at 752.
147. See Cooper v. Hobart, 206 D.L.R.4th 193,208 (Can. 2001); Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada,
206 D.L.R.4th 211, 218 (Can. 2001).
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liability for "regulatory negligence" in the domains of economic and
professional regulation, the Court demurred, and, in so doing, lessened
dramatically the opportunities for the use of tort as a vehicle for imposing
liability in such contexts, both generally and in relation to activities that the
government has either privatized or outsourced while still retaining some
degree of "regulatory control."
In Cooper v. Hobart148 and Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada,149
the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed appeals by two groups of investors
who wanted to sue the British Columbia Registrar of Mortgage Brokers and the
Law Society of Upper Canada, respectively. The plaintiffs claimed they had
lost millions of dollars in the 1990s due to the regulators' alleged negligence in
overseeing the conduct of a mortgage broker and a lawyer, which included the
failure to warn them that their funds were being misused.
The Court applied the two-part approach articulated in Anns v. Merton
London Borough Council50 and Kamloops (City of) v. Nielsen'51 to determine
whether a duty of care existed in each situation.15 2 The first part of the Anns
test asks whether the circumstances disclose reasonably foreseeable harm and
proximity sufficient to establish a prima facie duty of care.15 3 The court focuses
on factors arising from the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant,
including broad considerations of policy. The starting point is to determine
whether the case falls within or is analogous to a category of cases in which a
duty of care has been previously recognized. If no such cases exist, the
question then becomes whether a new duty of care should be recognized in the
circumstances. The second part asks whether residual policy considerations
exist which justify denying liability. 54 These include, among other things, the
effect on other legal obligations of recognizing that duty of care, its impact on
the legal system and, a less precise but important consideration, the effect of
imposing liability on society in general.
In Cooper, the issue was stated as: "Does a statutory regulator owe a duty
of care to members of the investing public for the (alleged) negligence in
failing to oversee the conduct of an investment company licensed by the
148. 206 D.L.R.4th 193 (Can. 2001).
149. 206 D.L.R.4th 211 (Can. 2001).
150. [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.).
151. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2.
152. Cooper, 206 D.L.R.4th at 201-10; Edwards, 206 D.L.R.4th at 217-20.
153. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 10.
154. Id.
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regulator?"' " The Court determined that this was not a duty of care recognized
thus far by Canadian courts. Thereafter, the Court inquired whether the law of
negligence should be extended to reach this situation, since, as noted in
Donoghue v. Stevenson,' 56 the categories of negligence are not closed. The
Court stated that if factors giving rise to proximity exist, they must arise from
the governing statute under which the Registrar is appointed. The Court held
that the Mortgage Brokers Act' 57 did not impose a duty of care on the Registrar
to investors with mortgage brokers regulated by the Act. The Registrar's duty
was rather to the public as a whole. Indeed, a duty to individual investors
would potentially conflict with the Registrar's overarching duty to the public.
The Court reviewed the provisions in the Act and saw the regulatory scheme as
providing a general framework for the operation of the mortgage
marketplace. 158 The Court stated further that, even if a prima facie duty of care
had been established under the first branch of the Anns test, it would have been
negated at the second stage for overriding policy reasons. These included the
following: a duty of care owed by the Registrar would be inconsistent with the
Registrar's need to balance the public and private interests while acting quasi-
judicially in deciding whether to remove a broker's license; the Registrar must
make difficult discretionary decisions in the area of public policy, which
commanded deference; the "spectre of indeterminate liability would loom large
if a duty of care was recognized in this case;"'159 and, finally, the impact of
imposing a duty of care on the taxpayers, who did not agree to assume the risk
of private loss to persons in the situation of the plaintiff investors, would
effectively be to create an insurance scheme for investors at great cost to the
taxpaying public, absent any legislative intent to do so.
For the same reasons as in Cooper, the Supreme Court decided in Edwards
that no duty of care arose between the respondent Law Society of Upper
Canada and the appellants who deposited money into a solicitor's trust account
as participants in a third-party business promotion. The issue was stated as:
"Does the Law Society of Upper Canada owe a duty of care to persons who
deposit money into a solicitor's trust account in respect of losses resulting from
misuse of the account?'
'160
155. Cooper, 206 D.L.R.4th at 20.
156. [19321 A.C. 562 (appeal taken from Scot.).
157. R.S.B.C., ch. 313 (1996) (Can.).
158. Id. §§. 4, 5,6,7, 8, 14, 20.
159. See Cooper, 206 D.L.R.4th at 54
160. See Edwards, 206 D.L.R.4th at 7
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The Court held that this was not a situation in which a duty of care had
heretofore been recognized, nor was it a case in which a new duty of care
should be recognized. The Court stated that the governing statute, the Law
Society Act, 161 did not reveal any legislative intent to impose a private-law duty
on the Law Society. The Law Society Act was intended to protect clients and
thereby the public as a whole. However, that did not mean that the Law
Society of Upper Canada owed a private-law duty of care to a member of the
public who deposited money into a solicitor's trust account. Decisions made by
the Law Society required the exercise of legislatively delegated discretion and
involve pursuing myriad objectives consistent with public rather than private
law duties. The Court noted that a public insurance scheme, funded by the
legal profession-the Lawyers' Professional Indemnity Corporation (LPIC)-
provided insurance for claims by clients against their lawyers for negligence.
The Court concluded that, as in Cooper, even if a prima facie duty of care arose
between the Law Society and the appellants who deposited money into a
solicitor's trust account, such a duty of care would have been negated by
residual policy considerations outside the relationship of the parties.
In sum, even leaving aside the "forensic lottery" features of tort as an
effective and efficient basis for providing compensation, particularly in the
domain of claims against the government and its agencies, the prospects of
using a regime of regulatory negligence as a judicial accountability mechanism
have been diminished dramatically by these two judgments and the policy
perspectives on which they are predicated. At least in the domain of economic
loss caused by regulatory failure, even on the part of entities that would seem to
be statutorily designated "watchdogs", there will now be, Nielsen
notwithstanding, few situations in which those suffering financial setbacks will
recover damages against the regulator. Whether the same philosophy is one
that the Supreme Court of Canada will in the future apply in cases involving
regulatory authorities charged with safeguarding health and physical safety, or
the security of real and personal property other than money, remains an open
question and, of course, one that is of great moment in the now-privatized but
still regulated world.
161. R.S.O., ch. L-8 (1990) (Can.).
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D. Private Law Enforcement
Canadian courts have not traditionally been hospitable to public-minded
citizens seeking to enforce, either directly or indirectly, adherence by others to
legislated or regulator-imposed standards. In this context, the courts have
tended to apply the very onerous test for standing developed in the context of
citizen actions against public nuisances. Only where the nuisance, action, or
inaction affects an individual right of the litigant, or where the litigant is
adversely affected in way that differentiates that litigant from the rest of the
public, is standing as of right available. 62 Indeed, in the domain of licensing
and other forms of business regulation, even competitors have seldom been
allowed to challenge the failure of regulators to enforce the law against other
participants.163 For these purposes, it has not mattered whether the action is
one in which the private litigant is seeking a remedy to compel the regulator to
engage in appropriate enforcement'6 or is asking the courts to take the place of
the regulator and directly ensure compliance with the law by the offender.
65
Aside from a general philosophy that ensuring adherence to the law is
primarily the role of government, the courts also not unnaturally tend to view
the legislative choice of a particular mode of enforcement as an indicator of
exclusivity. Putting it another way, it would be trampling on the prerogatives
or discretions of the regulator to allow private enforcement of legislative and,
particularly, regulator-imposed standards. 166 Indeed, while the Supreme Court
of Canada eventually recognized a limited role for public interest standing in
both constitutional and administrative law,1 67 the according of such standing
162. See, e.g., Cowan v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 2 O.R. 309, 56 D.L.R.2d 578 (Ont. Ct. App. 1996),
appeal denied, [ 1966] S.C.R. vii, [1966] R.C.S. vii, at 311 (applying the traditional English standing rule laid
down in cases such as Boyce v. Paddington Corp., I Ch. 109 (1903)).
163. See, e.g., Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue (No. 1), 2 F.C. 500 (Ct. App.
1976).
164. But see Re District of North Vancouver and National Harbours Board, 89 D.L.R.3d 704 (Fed. Ct.
1978).
165. See, e.g., Shore Disposal Ltd. v. Ed DeWolfe Trucking Ltd., 16 N.S.R.2d 538,72 D.L.R.3d 219 (N.S.
Sup. Ct. 1976).
166. Id.
167. The foundational cases are Thorson v. Attorney General, I S.C.R. 138, 43 D.L.R.3d 1 (1975)
(Constitution Act, 1867); Minister of Finance v. Finlay, 2 S.C.R. 607, 33 D.L.R.4th 321 (1986)
(administrative law); Canadian Council of Churches v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, I S.C.R.
236, 88 D.L.R.4th 193 (1992) (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). With respect to the examples
discussed in this paper, it is worth noting that, in Payne, Justice Gans relied upon Finlay to accord public
interest standing to two unions challenging the validity of the IPO of shares in Hydro One, even though one of
those unions did not represent the employees of any hydro companies. Payne v. Ontario (Minister of Energy,
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remains a matter of discretion, not entitlement. One of the critical factors in the
exercise of that judicial discretion is the availability of other more convenient
or appropriate ways of vindicating the public interest at stake. Obviously,
under such a test, the presence of other legislatively designated mechanisms for
ensuring enforcement in most instances will count as an equally, if not more,
convenient way of ensuring adherence to the law.
All of this would tend to suggest little role, at least under current
conditions, for private law enforcement when those engaged in privatized or
outsourced activities fail to adhere to the terms and conditions the government
has imposed on them, either in primary or subordinate legislation or as part of
general or situation-specific directions from a "regulator." Nonetheless, it may
be that the new "regulatory" environment is creating conditions that could lead
to a reevaluation of the traditional position. Thus, for example, appeals for
judicial deference to the legislative choice of the regulator or a particular mode
of enforcement begin to sound somewhat hollow in the face of sustained
regulator inactivity or failure, resulting either from a lack of resources or a
general philosophy of not wanting to enforce the law for fear of disrupting the
economic viability of private entrepreneurs. In the language of the public
interest standing test, there may "be no other reasonable and effective manner
in which the issue may be brought before a court. ,168 Indeed, in developing
this aspect of the discretionary authority of courts to accord public interest
standing, the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged that the inquiry to be
engaged in was not simply a theoretical one. The courts were to go beyond
looking at the other available means of rectifying the wrong to a consideration
of whether "there was anyone with a more direct interest than the plaintiff who
would be likely to challenge the legislation [or administrative action or
inaction].' 69 The courts will be attuned to the realities of what is at stake when
called upon to extend the reach of private law enforcement in a privatized
environment. One of those realities in a world of "less" government spending
is the inadequacy of the resources available to many "regulators," be they
regulatory agencies or offices of central government. The other and more
compelling reality will be any increase in the incidence of regulatory failure and
adverse consequences flowing from such failures.
Sci. & Tech.), O.J. No. 1450, paras. 8-19 (Super. Ct. J. 2002) (Q.L.). It was sufficient that the union
represented a constituency that relied on the availability of affordable sources of electricity. Id. at para. 8. See
Hydra One Ruling Potent Union Tool, Lawyer Says, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 23, 2002, at B3.
168. See Finlay, 2 S.C.R. at 633.
169. Id.
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As noted earlier, the capacity of tort to alleviate the consequences of
regulatory failure is restricted both in terms of the theoretical reach of tort law
in such circumstances and its limited availability in a practical sense to those
who have been harmed and have legitimate claims. Moreover, even within
regimes where tort does supply an avenue of vindication, the after-the-event
costs to government, and ultimately the public, of dealing with the fallout will
often be astronomical. This is starkly evident in any number of the examples of
regulatory failure that feature so regularly in the media and form part of the
consciousness of judges. The events in Walkerton, Ontario provide a graphic
example. There, failures in regulation of the water supply system, including the
default or inadequacy of privatized testing laboratories, led to many deaths and
to long-term health consequences for many others.170 The cost to the public
purse of dealing with the immediate and long-term consequences (including the
subsequent massive public inquiry17 1 and the settlement of claims) provides a
clear lesson. The same is true of the costs to the federal government and the
Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches in dealing with the enormous number
of claims arising out of sexual and other forms of abuse in the operation of
residential schools for First Nations children by the Churches. All of this may
well lead to an environment in which courts are much more sympathetic to
claims by private citizens that will, in effect, nip regulatory failure in the bud,
particularly in contexts in which the perpetuation of the inadequacies of
designated enforcement mechanisms has the potential for catastrophic
consequences in the future.
To this point, there is not much authority that can be marshaled in support
of this extended role for private law enforcement. However, a recent decision
of the Federal Court of Appeal may provide both a basis on which to advance
such a claim and a first indicator of changing judicial attitudes. In Harris v.
Canada,172 the Federal Court of Appeal allowed standing to a private citizen to
challenge an allegedly illegal arrangement between the revenue authorities and
a taxpayer with respect to the taxation of an offshore trust. Relying on the
public interest standing jurisprudence, and refusing to be bound by an English
170. J. O'CONNOR, REPORT OF THE WALKERTON INQUIRY, PART ONE: THE EVENTS OF MAY 2000 AND
RELATED ISSUES 2 (2002), available at http://www.walkertoninquiry.com/reportl/index.html.
171. See id.; see also J. O'CONNOR, REPORT OF THE WALKERTON INQUIRY, PART TWO: A STRATEGY FOR
SAFE DRINKING WATER (2002), available at http://www.walkertoninquiry.com/report2/index.htm.
172. 4 F.C. 37, 187 D.L.R.4th (Ct. App. 2000).
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authority 73 that could be read as denying a role for private law enforcement in
revenue matters, the Court held that, as there was no other reasonable and
effective manner of testing the legality of the arrangement, it should accord the
plaintiff standing to proceed with his claim. The issue at stake was of great
public interest, and the taxpayer was certainly not going to question the
favorable treatment, nor was the government itself ever likely to rescind
whatever agreement it had reached with taxpayer.
Of course, one must acknowledge not only the slimness of the support for
this expansion of the scope of private law enforcement, but also the fact that it
too will tend to be random or haphazard, and dependent on the existence not
only of public-spirited citizens and groups, but of public-spirited citizens and
groups with very considerable resources. There must also be serious questions
as to how far the courts would be willing to go in developing this mechanism.
It is one thing to allow such causes of action when the allegation is, for
example, that of a failure by a private-sector deliverer of services to comply
with the specific standards expressly created by primary legislation. It is quite
another matter, in terms of traditional notions of privity, to countenance the
standing of private citizens to enforce the terms of contracts entered into
between private-sector actors and government for the delivery of various
services. In short, private law enforcement is a poor substitute for state
enforcement of standards. However, where the commitment of the state to
ensuring compliance is limited, it may at least offer some possibilities for filling
the regulatory enforcement gap.
CONCLUSIONS
To those who look to the Canadian courts as a mechanism for imposing
some constraints on the privatization, downsizing, outsourcing, and
deregulatory activities of governments across the country, this paper conveys a
largely depressing message. Whether by reference to principles of
constitutional law or administrative law, the possibilities for holding
government legally accountable for the initiation and implementation of such
programs are, at present, few indeed.
173. In particular, Reg. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1982] A.C. 617 (H.L.), though some of the
speeches in that case were equivocal in the sense of not wanting to lay down a universal rule against taxpayer
standing.
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Certainly, there are some unresolved issues in the constitutional domain.
Indeed, should the Supreme Court of Canada favor the appellant's claims in
Gosselin on the basis of a broader conception of the substantive role of section
7 of the Charter, this may have the impact of generating a broader range of
constitutionally protected rights to at least basic-level income support for
Canadians in need. 174 In addition, there may be some prospect for expanded
use of certain administrative law or common public law principles for
achieving accountability with respect to the implementation of these policies,
both in the courts and within the regulatory regimes responsible for supervision
of private-sector engagement in functions previously carried on by government.
However, the realistic potential of all of these possibilities may not be all
that great, particularly given the ability of government to override Charter
protections, to advance Section 1 justifications for derogations from Charter
rights and freedoms, and to ensure legislative exclusion of liability for various
activities. Indeed, to this ability can be linked the lack of effective access to
relevant information and data by reason of the frequent inapplicability of
freedom of information legislation, 175 as well as judicially imposed limits on the
otherwise most obvious legal principles. More generally, this is the domain of
political choice, where the role of the courts and the rule of law is limited or, at
least, has traditionally been perceived to be limited, by the courts of this and
other common law jurisdictions.
This sense of pessimism is exacerbated by what seems to be an increase in
the so-called "democratic deficit." Legislatures in Canada meet less often, the
opposition is either fragmented or nonexistent in a number ofjurisdictions, and
parliamentary committees are increasingly controlled by the governing party
and operate under an increasing sense of rigid party discipline. In addition, the
concentration of effective power in the hands of cabinet (or frequently a few
members of cabinet and their personal advisors), at the expense of caucus and
parliament generally, appears to be almost inexorable. Moreover,
notwithstanding the obviousness of these problems, there is a real lack of
174. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
175. Secrecy concerns surface frequently in the privatized and outsourced world as the standards of private
sector business are advanced as reasons for refusing access to relevant material; to allow arrangements
between governments and private sector actors for the delivery of previously public services would be unfair
to the competitive position of potential private sector participants and deter many from bidding. See, e.g.,
Official Decries Secrecy Rules on Power Costs, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, June 22, 2002, at AI0 (with
reference to section 14.1 of the Electricity Act, as inserted by R.S.O. 2002, ch. 1) and Gag order keeps
nuclear lease secret, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 16, 2002 (both in the context of the "privatization" of
Ontario Hydro).
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commitment to the project of the reform of parliamentary institutions. Vested
interests constantly get in the way.
All of this is particularly alarming in an era of privatization and
globalization, when vigilance is especially important in guarding against the
potentially disastrous consequences of unconstrained evolution in the extent
and impact of both these phenomena. Until now, environmental tragedy and
spectacular financial collapses have been the principal spurs to greater public
awareness of the need for government to ensure effective, consistent regulation.
Indeed, these are the events that can still bring governments into jeopardy and
thus have the capacity to generate policy and regulatory reform, if for no reason
other than the self-preservation instincts of the party in power.
However, it is an impoverished view of the role of government to regard it
as there primarily to react to disaster and tragedy, as opposed to anticipating
problems and putting in place preventative and facilitative mechanisms. These
mechanisms are necessary to ensure that a less constrained private sector is
sufficiently cognizant of overriding public interests and that fragile national
institutions and policies are not the chance victims of globalization. The
challenge is therefore primarily that of finding the will to engage in revitalizing
traditional parliamentary institutions, and also to see benefit in and encourage
the evolution of and participation in surrogate democratic processes.
Public law is not without a role in this project. Indeed, the invocation of
public law principles in the courts and before regulatory bodies can itself be a
powerful form of alternative democratic involvement, as well as a vital
accountability mechanism. Beyond that, Canadians need to reflect carefully on
the problem of whether the public law principles that we have presently are
ones that are wholly suited to the task ahead. Our own hunch is that there is a
need for far greater awareness on the part of courts, particularly of the nature
and the dimensions of the potential problems of privatization and globalization.
With this awareness should come a greater commitment to the importance of
thinking creatively about the role that public law can play in ensuring that vital
public interests do not get overlooked or discarded in these heady days of
profound change.
POSTSCRIPT
1. The Supreme Court of Canada rendered judgment in Gosselin v.
Quebec (Attorney General) on December 18, 2002. The appeal was
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dismissed.1 76 In terms of matters raised in the body of our paper, the
Court did not deal with the issue of whether discrimination on the
basis of poverty or economic status could in any circumstances be an
analogous ground of discrimination for the purposes of section 15 of
the Charter and, while dismissing the claim that the regulatory
regime violated Ms. Gosselin's right to "life, liberty and security of
the person," the case left open the possibility that, on other facts, a
claim to minimum level of support might be asserted. In short, the
case did not in fact resolve definitively the critical issues of the
extent to which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a
social charter.
2. Since this paper was written, much has gone wrong with the
privatization of Ontario's power generation, sale, and distribution
operations. In June 2002, the Government announced that the sale
of Hydro One would not proceed. 177  Earlier that month, the
Government had also forced the resignation of the Board of Hydro
One over issues of executive compensation and more particularly
the severance package given to its departing CEO, a severance
package which the Government subsequently reneged on. 178 Then,
in November, the Government announced a cap on the price of
electricity until 2006, thereby putting on long hold the open market
pricing system. 179  Shortly thereafter, the Chair of the Ontario
Energy Board resigned in the face of public criticism by the
Premier. 8 ° In the meantime, British Energy, the operator of a
number of Ontario nuclear power plants, went into financial free
fall,' 8' causing it to sell its stake. Very obviously, the detail of the
exercise recounted in the paper is now proceeding in a somewhat
modified manner.
176. [2002] S.C.C. 84.
177. Eves Kills Harris's $5-billion Hydro One Sale, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, June 13, 2002, at 1.
178. Paul Waldie et al., Hydro One Purge Kills IPO, Critics Say. TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, June 5,2002,
at 1.
179. Janet McFarland, Power Failure: Ontario's Aborted Plan, TORONTO GLOBE& MAIL, November 16,
2002, at B 1.
180. Richard Mackie, Energy Chief Announces Resignation, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, November 14,
2002, at A8.
181. Eric Reguly, British Energy Debacle Provides Lesson for Privatization Advocates, TORONTO GLOBE
& MAIL, September 17, 2002, at 1.
